Future oil supply, production, price, non-conventional supplies, transport use – what might the future hold?

The debate over whether or not we have reached “peak oil” continues. If peak oil is taken to be the highest rate of extraction of conventional crude oil, that may already have happened. Though total global consumption of oil is rising, part of this is now from non-conventional sources. In 2011 some 89 million barrels of oil and liquid fuels were consumed per day worldwide (nearly 32 billion barrels a year). The IEA says: “Our analysis suggests there are ample physical oil and liquid fuel resources for the foreseeable future.” Forecasts of global oil use suggest slower growth in the total amount of liquid fuels available. BP says: “Oil and other liquids remain the slowest growing fuel in our outlook, with demand up by just 0.8% p.a., reaching 104 Mb/d by 2030″.  The IEA says: ” Although liquid fuels—mostly petroleum-based—remain the largest source of energy, the liquids share of world marketed energy consumption falls from 34% in 2010 to 28% in 2040, as projected high world oil prices lead many energy users to switch away from liquid fuels when feasible.” The price of oil is expected to rise. IEA says: “With prices expected to increase in the long term, the world oil price in real 2011 dollars reaches $106 per barrel in 2020 and $163 per barrel in 2040 in the IEO2013 Reference case.” Many fear the high oil price will mean economies will thus face prolonging global economic recession.  A high oil price will necessitate cuts in demand, which in turn may maintain a longer undulating oil production plateau. The transport sector used 55% of the world’s total liquid fuels in 2010.


 DECC’s oil price projections are at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212521/130718_decc-fossil-fuel-price-projections.pdf

Their central estimate is $110 for 2013.    $119.7 in 2020.     $135 in 2030.


Former BP geologist, Dr Miller: peak oil is here and it will ‘break economies’


Earth Insight, by Nafeez Ahmed (Guardian)

Industry expert warns of grim future of ‘recession’ driven ‘resource wars’ at University College London lecture

A former British Petroleum (BP) geologist has warned that the age of cheap oil is long gone, bringing with it the danger of “continuous recession” and increased risk of conflict and hunger.

At a lecture on ‘Geohazards’ earlier this month as part of the postgraduate Natural Hazards for Insurers course at University College London (UCL), Dr. Richard G. Miller, who worked for BP from 1985 before retiring in 2008, said that official data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), US Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), among other sources, showed that conventional oil had most likely peaked around 2008.

Dr. Miller critiqued the official industry line that global reserves will last 53 years at current rates of consumption, pointing out that “peaking is the result of declining production rates, not declining reserves.” Despite new discoveries and increasing reliance on unconventional oil and gas, 37 countries are already post-peak, and global oil production is declining at about 4.1% per year, or 3.5 million barrels a day (b/d) per year:

“We need new production equal to a new Saudi Arabia every 3 to 4 years to maintain and grow supply… New discoveries have not matched consumption since 1986. We are drawing down on our reserves, even though reserves are apparently climbing every year. Reserves are growing due to better technology in old fields, raising the amount we can recover – but production is still falling at 4.1% p.a. [per annum].”

Dr. Miller, who prepared annual in-house projections of future oil supply for BP from 2000 to 2007, refers to this as the “ATM problem” – “more money, but still limited daily withdrawals.” As a consequence: “Production of conventional liquid oil has been flat since 2008. Growth in liquid supply since then has been largely of natural gas liquids [NGL]- ethane, propane, butane, pentane – and oil-sand bitumen.”

Dr. Miller is co-editor of a special edition of the prestigious journal,Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, published this month on the future of oil supply. In an introductory paper co-authored with Dr. Steve R. Sorrel, co-director of the Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex in Brighton, they argue that among oil industry experts “there is a growing consensus that the era of cheap oil has passed and that we are entering a new and very different phase.” They endorse the conservative conclusions of an extensive earlier study by the government-funded UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC):

“… a sustained decline in global conventional production appears probable before 2030 and there is significant risk of this beginning before 2020… on current evidence the inclusion of tight oil [shale oil] resources appears unlikely to significantly affect this conclusion, partly because the resource base appears relatively modest.”

In fact, increasing dependence on shale could worsen decline rates in the long run:

“Greater reliance upon tight oil resources produced using hydraulic fracturing will exacerbate any rising trend in global average decline rates, since these wells have no plateau and decline extremely fast – for example, by 90% or more in the first 5 years.”

Tar sands will fare similarly, they conclude, noting that “the Canadian oil sands will deliver only 5 mb per day by 2030, which represents less than 6% of the IEA projection of all-liquids production by that date.”

Despite the cautious projection of global peak oil “before 2020”, they also point out that:

“Crude oil production grew at approximately 1.5% per year between 1995 and 2005, but then plateaued with more recent increases in liquids supply largely deriving from NGLs, oil sands and tight oil. These trends are expected to continue… Crude oil production is heavily concentrated in a small number of countries and a small number of giant fields, with approximately 100 fields producing one half of global supply, 25 producing one quarter and a single field (Ghawar in Saudi Arabia) producing approximately 7%. Most of these giant fields are relatively old, many are well past their peak of production, most of the rest seem likely to enter decline within the next decade or so and few new giant fields are expected to be found.”

“The final peak is going to be decided by the price – how much can we afford to pay?”, Dr. Miller told me in an interview about his work. “If we can afford to pay $150 per barrel, we could certainly produce more given a few years of lead time for new developments, but it would break economies again.”

Miller argues that for all intents and purposes, peak oil has arrived as conditions are such that despite volatility, prices can never return to pre-2004 levels:

“The oil price has risen almost continuously since 2004 to date, starting at $30. There was a great spike to $150 and then a collapse in 2008/2009, but it has since climbed to $110 and held there. The price rise brought a lot of new exploration and development, but these new fields have not actually increased production by very much, due to the decline of older fields. This is compatible with the idea that we are pretty much at peak today. This recession is what peak feels like.”

Although he is dismissive of shale oil and gas’ capacity to prevent a peak and subsequent long decline in global oil production, Miller recognises that there is still some leeway that could bring significant, if temporary dividends for US economic growth – though only as “a relatively short-lived phenomenon”:

“We’re like a cage of lab rats that have eaten all the cornflakes and discovered that you can eat the cardboard packets too. Yes, we can, but… Tight oil may reach 5 or even 6 million b/d in the US, which will hugely help the US economy, along with shale gas. Shale resources, though, are inappropriate for more densely populated countries like the UK, because the industrialisation of the countryside affects far more people (with far less access to alternative natural space), and the economic benefits are spread more thinly across more people. Tight oil production in the US is likely to peak before 2020. There absolutely will not be enough tight oil production to replace the US’ current 9 million b/d of imports.”

In turn, by prolonging global economic recession, high oil prices may reduce demand. Peak demand in turn may maintain a longer undulating oil production plateau:

“We are probably in peak oil today, or at least in the foot-hills. Production could rise a little for a few years yet, but not sufficiently to bring the price down; alternatively, continuous recession in much of the world may keep demand essentially flat for years at the $110/bbl price we have today. But we can’t grow the supply at average past rates of about 1.5% per year at today’s prices.”

The fundamental dependence of global economic growth on cheap oil supplies suggests that as we continue into the age of expensive oil and gas, without appropriate efforts to mitigate the impacts and transition to a new energy system, the world faces a future of economic and geopolitical turbulence:

“In the US, high oil prices correlate with recessions, although not all recessions correlate with high oil prices. It does not prove causation, but it is highly likely that when the US pays more than 4% of its GDP for oil, or more than 10% of GDP for primary energy, the economy declines as money is sucked into buying fuel instead of other goods and services… A shortage of oil will affect everything in the economy. I expect more famine, more drought, more resource wars and a steady inflation in the energy cost of all commodities.”

According to another study in the Royal Society journal special edition by professor David J. Murphy of Northern Illinois University, an expert in the role of energy in economic growth, the energy return on investment (EROI) for global oil and gas production – the amount of energy produced compared to the amount of energy invested to get, deliver and use that energy – is roughly 15 and declining. For the US, EROI of oil and gas production is 11 and declining; and for unconventional oil and biofuels is largely less than 10. The problem is that as EROI decreases, energy prices increase. Thus, Murphy concludes:

“… the minimum oil price needed to increase the oil supply in the near term is at levels consistent with levels that have induced past economic recessions. From these points, I conclude that, as the EROI of the average barrel of oil declines, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.”

Current EROI in the US, Miller said, is simply “not enough to support the US infrastructure, even if America was self-sufficient, without raising production even further than current consumption.”

In their introduction to their collection of papers in the Royal Society journal, Miller and Sorrell point out that “most authors” in the special edition “accept that conventional oil resources are at an advanced stage of depletion and that liquid fuels will become more expensive and increasingly scarce.” The shale revolution can provide only “short-term relief”, but is otherwise “unlikely to make a significant difference in the longer term.”

They call for a “coordinated response” to this challenge to mitigate the impact, including “far-reaching changes in global transport systems.” While “climate-friendly solutions to ‘peak oil’ are available” they caution, these will be neither “easy” nor “quick”, and imply a model of economic development that accepts lower levels of consumption and mobility.

In his interview with me, Richard Miller was particularly critical of the UK government’s policies, including abandoning large-scale wind farm projects, the reduction of feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, and support for shale gas. “The government will do anything for the short-term economic bounce,” he said, “but the consequence will be that the UK is tied more tightly to an oil-based future, and we will pay dearly for it.”

Dr Nafeez Ahmed is executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development and author of A User’s Guide to the Crisis of Civilisation: And How to Save It among other books. Follow him on Twitter@nafeezahmed


Dr. Richard Miller

A geologist by training (Oxford, Alberta and Cambridge), with early experience in gold mining and uranium, before joining BP in 1985. In BP he had a varied career, primarily as a geochemist. He has been looking at peak oil issues for 15 years, and used to provide an annual in-house report for BP on likely oil productivity out to 2030, before retiring earlier in 2008.  He is a trustee of ODAC (see below) which is now part of nef



ODAC  – Oil Depletion Analysis Centre (now part of nef – the New Economics Foundation)

About ODAC and nef

From 30th March 2012, the activities of the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre (ODAC) were taken over by nef (the new economics foundation)who have agreed to continue ODAC’s work to raise international public awareness and promote better understanding of the world’s oil-depletion problem.

The website and newsletter will be maintained by nef and continue under the name of ODAC.

ODAC was founded in June 2011 as an independent, UK registered educational charity on the belief that an informed public debate about the likely impacts of depleting oil supplies is critically needed. A growing number of experts now predict that world oil production will reach its ultimate peak within a few years and then start permanently to decline, while the prevailing view of most energy policy-makers and institutions is that near-term oil supply is mainly an economic and geopolitical concern. Under almost any scenario, however, lead time is running short for a smooth transition to new energy systems and a less oil dependent way of life.

ODAC aims to engage public interest, stimulate concern and create momentum for progressive change in energy policy and planning. We seek to do this by:

  • Disseminating available information as effectively as possible to news media, other opinion-formers and leaders, interest groups, and the public at large;
  • facilitating information exchanges between and among interested parties; and
  • monitoring developments in oil-depletion analysis, maintaining an up-to-date information base, and offering an advisory service on oil-depletion issues.
  • http://www.odac-info.org/about-odac
  • .
  • .

    .World crude oil consumption by year

  • yearconsumptionchange
    198158,013.31-3.20 %
    198256,722.96-2.22 %
    198356,002.25-1.27 %
    198457,064.081.90 %
    198557,382.490.56 %
    198658,996.112.81 %
    198760,385.752.36 %
    198862,269.803.12 %
    198963,497.391.97 %
    199063,875.130.59 %
    199166,970.884.85 %
    199267,136.270.25 %
    199367,587.530.67 %
    199468,927.091.98 %
    199570,130.201.75 %
    199671,712.412.26 %
    199773,459.282.44 %
    199874,109.430.89 %
    199975,872.742.38 %
    200076,779.141.19 %
    200177,468.540.90 %
    200278,163.600.90 %
    200379,708.271.98 %
    200482,564.873.58 %
    200584,067.141.82 %
    200685,132.051.27 %
    200785,901.960.90 %
    200884,463.22-1.67 %
    200984,756.560.35 %
    201087,371.343.09 %
    201187,356.29-0.02 %

    (thousand barrels per day)

  • BP’s Energy Outlook 2030  fact sheet

  • states:

    “Oil and other liquids remain the slowest growing fuel in our outlook, with demand up by just 0.8% p.a., reaching 104 Mb/d (+16) by 2030. Demand is driven by non-OECD transport.
    • The US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia will supply over a third of global liquids for the remainder of the outlook. The 2011 level of Call on OPEC isn’t reached again until 2021.
    • Natural gas will be the fastest growing fossil fuel at 2% p.a., reaching 456 Bcf/d (+144) by 2030. By volume, growth is greatest in power (+56 Bcf/d) and industry (+54 Bcf/d).



  • .


  • Oil Demand Shift

    From 2000 the increasing industrialization of the developing world has been the primary catalyst driving the demand for global crude oil. Among non-OECD nations, China and India have led the charge, with Chinese oil demand growing at a torrid 6.7% per annum rate and India’s oil demand growing at 4.0% per annum. Overall non-OECD demand for oil has increased at a comparable rate of 3.6% per annum, with the Asia/Pacific region growing oil demand at roughly 2.7%. Developed nations, however, have seen diminishing oil demand with a negative -.04% per annum growth rate.

    2014 OECD non OECD consumption

  • http://www.energytrendsinsider.com/2013/04/18/2013-crude-oil-outlook-supply-demand/




    IEA says:

    As of 2011, approximately 89 million barrels of oil and liquid fuels were consumed per day worldwide. That works out to nearly 32 billion barrels a year.

  • .What is peak oil?Peak oil can mean different things to different people. Some see it as the potential result of economies maturing and deploying more energy-efficient and diverse fuel technologies, meaning that year-on-year growth in world oil demand may level off. Others see it as the maximum possible annual rate of extraction of conventional crude oil, due either to physical resource constraints or above-ground political, economic or logistical factors. While others insist that since the definition of what constitutes conventional oil is constantly changing, total producible liquid fuels is what should be looked at.

    Where does the IEA stand in the peak oil argument?

    Our analysis suggests there are ample physical oil and liquid fuel resources for the foreseeable future. However, the rate at which new supplies can be developed and the break-even prices for those new supplies are changing. Global oil production levels are also dependent on the production policy of OPEC, which holds between one and six million barrels per day of spare capacity in reserve. Declining oil production in any given year can occur for one of several reasons unrelated to peak production, including OPEC production decisions, unplanned field stoppages and the impact of earlier investment decisions by the oil industry. A combination of sustained high prices and energy policies aimed at greater end-use efficiency and diversification in energy supplies might actually mean that peak oil demand occurs in the future before the resource base is anything like exhausted.

  • http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/oil/
  • .

  • .

  • International Energy Outlook 2013   (IEA)
  • The International Energy Outlook 2013 (IEO2013) projects that world energy consumption will grow by 56 percent between 2010 and 2040. Total world energy use rises from 524 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2010 to 630 quadrillion Btu in 2020 and to 820 quadrillion Btu in 2040 (Figure 1). Much of the growth in energy consumption occurs in countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),2 known as non-OECD, where demand is driven by strong, long-term economic growth. Energy use in non-OECD countries increases by 90 percent; in OECD countries, the increase is 17 percent. TheIEO2013 Reference case does not incorporate prospective legislation or policies that might affect energy markets.Renewable energy and nuclear power are the world’s fastest-growing energy sources, each increasing by 2.5 percent per year. However, fossil fuels continue to supply almost 80 percent of world energy use through 2040. Natural gas is the fastest-growing fossil fuel in the outlook. Global natural gas consumption increases by 1.7 percent per year. Increasing supplies of tight gas, shale gas, and coalbed methane support growth in projected worldwide natural gas use. Coal use grows faster than petroleum and other liquid fuel use until after 2030, mostly because of increases in China’s consumption of coal and tepid growth in liquids demand attributed to slow growth in the OECD regions and high sustained oil prices.

    The industrial sector continues to account for the largest share of delivered energy consumption; the world industrial sector still consumes over half of global delivered energy in 2040. Given current policies and regulations limiting fossil fuel use, worldwide energy-related carbon dioxide emissions rise from about 31 billion metric tons in 2010 to 36 billion metric tons in 2020 and then to 45 billion metric tons in 2040, a 46-percent increase.

  • http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/

  • .

  • IEA:
  • Do we have enough oil worldwide to meet our future needs?


  • As shown in EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2013, the global supply of crude oil, other liquid hydrocarbons, and biofuels is expected to be adequate to meet the world’s demand for liquid fuels for at least the next 25 years. There is, of course, substantial uncertainty about the levels of future oil supply and demand, and EIA reflects some of this uncertainty by developing low and high oil price cases, in addition to a reference case. The oil resources currently remaining in the Earth’s crust, in combination with expected volumes of other liquid fuels, are estimated to be sufficient to meet total demand for liquid fuels in all three price cases of the International Energy Outlook 2013.An often cited, although misleading, measurement of future resource availability is the reserves-to-production ratio, which given the current rate of consumption and total proved reserves is about 50 years. However, proved reserves are an accounting concept that is based on known projects and is not an appropriate measure for judging total resource availability in the long-term. Over time, numerous additional projects will be developed, which will add to global reserves. Furthermore, reserve estimates at known projects are likely to increase as new technologies are developed.
  • http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=38&t=6
  • This says:
  • Unrest in the Middle East has been one reason that oil prices have been in the range of $90 to $130 per barrel4 well into 2013. The Brent crude oil spot price averaged $112 per barrel in 2012, and EIA’s July 2013 Short-Term Energy Outlook projects averages of $105 per barrel in 2013 and $100 per barrel in 2014. With prices expected to increase in the long term, the world oil price in real 2011 dollars reaches $106 per barrel in 2020 and $163 per barrel in 2040 in the IEO2013 Reference case.High sustained oil prices can affect consumer demand for liquid fuels, encouraging the use of less energy or alternative forms of energy, but also encouraging more efficient use of energy. Energy efficiency improvements are anticipated in every end-use sector, with global liquids intensity—liquid fuels consumed per dollar of GDP—declining (improving) by 2.6 percent per year from 2010 to 2040. However, some of the greatest potential for altering the growth path of energy use is in the transportation sector. The U.S. transportation sector provides a good example of this potential to change future liquids consumption. More stringent U.S. vehicle fuel economy standards offset growth in transportation activity, resulting in a decline in the country’s use of petroleum and other liquids over the projection. Improving vehicle fuel economy standards will likely be adopted throughout most of the world, helping to moderate future growth in liquids consumption.
  • World energy markets by fuel type

    Figure 2. World energy consumption by fuel type, 1990-2040
    figure data

    In the long term, the IEO2013Reference case projects increased world consumption of marketed energy from all fuel sources through 2040 (Figure 2). Fossil fuels are expected to continue supplying much of the energy used worldwide. Although liquid fuels—mostly petroleum-based—remain the largest source of energy, the liquids share of world marketed energy consumption falls from 34 percent in 2010 to 28 percent in 2040, as projected high world oil prices lead many energy users to switch away from liquid fuels when feasible.

  • The fastest growing sources of world energy in the Reference case are renewables and nuclear power. In the Reference case, the renewables share of total energy use rises from 11 percent in 2010 to 15 percent in 2040, and the nuclear share grows from 5 percent to 7 percent.

    Liquid fuels

    World use of petroleum and other liquid fuels5grows from 87 million barrels per day in 2010 to 97 million barrels per day in 2020 and 115 million barrels per day in 2040. In the Reference case, all the growth in liquids use is in the transportation and industrial sectors. In the transportation sector, in particular, liquid fuels continue to provide most of the energy consumed. Although advances in nonliquids-based transportation technologies are anticipated, they are not enough to offset the rising demand for transportation services worldwide. Despite rising fuel prices, use of liquids for transportation increases by an average of 1.1 percent per year, or 38 percent overall, from 2010 to 2040. The transportation sector accounts for 63 percent of the total increase in liquid fuel use from 2010 to 2040, and the remainder is attributed to the industrial sector, where the chemicals industry continues to consume large quantities of petroleum throughout the projection. The use of liquids declines in the other end-use sectors and for electric power generation.

    To satisfy the increase in world liquids demand in the Reference case, liquids production increases by 28.3 million barrels per day from 2010 to 2040, including the production of both petroleum (crude oil and lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids [NGPL], bitumen, extra-heavy oil, and refinery gains), and other liquid fuels (coal-to-liquids [CTL], gas-to-liquids [GTL], biofuels, and kerogen).

  • The Reference case assumes that countries in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will invest in incremental production capacity in order to maintain a 39-43 percent share of total world liquids production through 2040, consistent with their share over the past 15 years. Increasing volumes of petroleum from OPEC producers contribute 13.8 million barrels per day to the total increase in world liquids production, and petroleum supplies from non-OPEC countries add another 11.5 million barrels per day (Figure 3).Figure 3. World petroleum and other liquids production, 2010-2040
    figure data

    Non-petroleum liquids resources from both OPEC and non-OPEC sources grow on average by 3.7 percent per year over the projection period, but they remain a relatively minor share of total liquids supply through 2040.

  • Production of non-petroleum liquids is supported by sustained high prices in the Reference case; however, their development also relies heavily on country-specific regulatory policies. World production of nonpetroleum liquids, which in 2010 totaled only 1.6 million barrels per day (less than 2 percent of total world liquids production), increases to 4.6 million barrels per day in 2040, about 4 percent of total world liquids production. The largest components of future nonpetroleum liquid fuels production are biofuels in Brazil and the United States, at 0.7 and 0.5 million barrels per day, respectively, and CTL in China, at 0.7 million barrels per day. Those three countries account for 64 percent of the total increase in nonpetroleum liquids supply over the projection period.Advances in technology make liquids production in previously inaccessible regions increasingly feasible, while higher oil prices make production in those regions economically viable. An important example of the potential impact of technological advances is the rapid growth of U.S. shale oil production in recent years, a development that has the potential to change the structure of oil markets worldwide. Although the extent of the world’s shale oil resources is not yet fully understood, there is potential for shale oil production to increase non-OPEC supplies of liquid fuels substantially over the course of the IEO2013 projection. A study commissioned by EIA to assess shale oil resources in 41 countries outside the United States,6 taken in conjunction with EIA’s own assessment of resources within the United States, indicate worldwide technically recoverable resources of 345 billion barrels of shale oil resources, which would add considerable non-OPEC liquid fuels production potential if the resources became economically competitive with other sources of liquids supply.
  • Transportation

    Energy use in the transportation sector includes the energy consumed in moving people and goods by road, rail, air, water, and pipeline. The transportation sector is second only to the industrial sector in terms of total end-use energy consumption. The transportation share of world total liquids consumption increases from 55 percent in 2010 to 57 percent in 2040 in the IEO2013 Reference case, accounting for 63 percent of the total increase in world liquids consumption. Thus, understanding the development of transportation energy use is key in assessing future trends in demand for liquid fuels.

    Sustained high world oil prices throughout the projection are partly the result of a strong increase in demand for transportation fuels, particularly in the emerging non-OECD economies, where income growth and demand for personal mobility, combined with rapid urbanization, will have the greatest impact on growth in world transportation energy use. In the IEO2013 Reference case, non-OECD transportation energy use grows by 2.2 percent per year from 2010 to 2040, and the non-OECD share of world demand for transportation liquids reaches 60 percent by the end of the projection (Figure 9). China, in particular, leads the projected global growth in transportation liquids demand, more than tripling its consumption from 8 quadrillion Btu in 2010 to 26 quadrillion Btu by 2040. In 2010, China’s transportation energy use was only one-third of that in the United States; in 2040, China is projected to consume about the same amount of energy for transportation as the United States.

    Figure 9. World transportation sector delivered energy consumption, 2010 and 2040
    figure data

    High oil prices and the economic recession had more profound impacts in the OECD economies than in the non-OECD economies. OECD energy use for transportation declined by 2.0 percent in 2008, followed by a further decrease of 3.1 percent in 2009, before recovering to 0.8-percent growth in 2010. Indications are that high world oil prices and slow recovery from the recession, with Japan and several key OECD economies falling back into recession in 2012, will mean that OECD transportation energy demand will continue to grow slowly in the near- to mid-term. In addition, demand for transportation liquids in OECD countries will be tempered by policies aimed at instituting strong energy efficiency improvements. Over the projection period, OECD transportation energy use declines by an average of 0.1 percent per year.

  • World carbon dioxide emissions

    Figure 10. World energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by fuel type, 1990-2040
    figure data

    World energy-related carbon dioxide emissions rise from 31.2 billion metric tons in 2010 to 36.4 billion metric tons in 2020 and 45.5 billion metric tons in 2040 in the IEO2013 Reference
    case—an increase of 46 percent over the projection period. With strong economic growth and continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels expected for most non-OECD economies under current policies, much of the projected increase in carbon dioxide emissions occurs among the developing non-OECD nations. In 2010, non-OECD emissions exceeded OECD emissions by 38 percent; in 2040, they are projected to exceed OECD emissions by about 127 percent. Coal continues to account for the largest share of carbon dioxide emissions throughout the projection (Figure 10).

    Figure 11. OECD and non-OECD carbon intensities, 1990-2040
    figure data

    Carbon intensity of output—the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of economic output—is a common measureit is sometimes used as a stand-alone measure for tracking progress in relative emissions reductions. Energy-related carbon dioxide intensities improve (decline) in all IEO regions over the projection period, as economies continue to use energy more efficiently. Estimated carbon dioxide intensity declines by 1.9 percent per year in the OECD economies and by 2.7 percent per year in the non-OECD economies from 2010 to 2040 (Figure 11).

  • http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/more_highlights.cfm
  • http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/aeo_query_server/?event=ehChart.getChart&study=IEO2013&region=0-0&row=28-1-IEO2013&cases=Reference-d041117